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it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms. In this paper we build a 
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advertising and offer consumers a service free of charge (such as a TV program) that is 
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A series of recent papers have looked at competition and regulation in the televi-
sion and radio broadcasting market by using "two-sided market" models. In these
setups platforms, which are broadcasting channels, match viewers and advertis-
ers. Viewers dislike advertisements and competition has the special feature that
each platform has a "participation externality" on its competitors. If a platform
changes its advertising level, then it in°uences its own and the competitors' num-
ber of viewers. This is an externality that works via the viewer market.
In the real world, however, platforms do not only experience participation
externalities, but also pecuniary externalities. In contrast to participation exter-
nalities, which work via the viewer market, pecuniary externalities work via the
advertising market. Hence, we will take into account that a change in a chan-
nel's advertising level does not only a®ect the distribution of the viewers between
the channels, but it also changes the broadcasters' total supply in the advertis-
ing market. When the broadcasters' total supply changes, then the market price
for advertising has to adjust in order to clear the market. This price adjustment
changes the revenue of all platforms and yields a pecuniary externality. So far,
this pecuniary externality has been neglected in the existing literature. In this
paper we show that pecuniary externalities are important because they in°uence
the theoretical predictions substantially.
In the following we illustrate the existence of pecuniary externalities with two
examples. In Germany, free available public broadcasting channels are compet-
ing with free available private broadcasting channels. The public broadcasting
channels are ¯nanced through fees and are not allowed to o®er advertising after 8
pm. The private channels are allowed to o®er advertising after 8 pm. The public
broadcasting channels are currently running a de¯cit. Hence, there is a debate in
Germany: Should one increase the fee or should one allow the public broadcasting
channels to o®er advertising after 8 pm in order to balance their budget? The
position of the private channels is: Do not allow them to o®er advertisements after
8 pm. Instead, increase the fee or force them to reduce their expenditures! 1 This
statement is surprising. Given our existing knowledge of competition in such a
1Press release "Verband Privater Rundfunkt und Telekommunikation (VPRT), 26.9.2003"
2two-sided market, advertising after 8 pm decreases the attractiveness of the public
channels. The resulting participation externality should be in the interest of the
private channels. Therefore, private channels should like the idea of advertising on
public channels. However, the neglected aspect here is that private channels fear
that the additional time for commercials decreases the price for advertisements.
Due to this pecuniary externality, they dislike the idea of advertisements on public
channels.
The other example is taken from the US television market. In the 70s the
Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged that the "Code of Conduct" of the National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), which regulated the competition between the
broadcasting channels, violated antitrust laws.2 In particular the "Code of Con-
duct" included
(i) a limitation of the advertising time on each channel to 9.5 minutes per hour
in prime time and sixteen minutes per hour at all the other times
(ii) a limitation of the number of commercials per hour
(iii) a limitation of the number of advertised products in one hour.
The DOJ argued that these rules had the purpose and e®ect of manipulating
the supply of commercial television time with the result that the price for adver-
tisements had been raised. This would violate the Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
As a result of the allegation and subsequent legal judicial proceedings, the NAB
voluntarily abandoned its "Code of Conduct" in the year 1983. From an economic
point of view, these advertising ceilings cannot be explained without pecuniary
externalities. In the existing models, like Anderson and Coate (2005), collusion
between the channels results in an agreement that every channel has to o®er a
minimum level of advertising because the equilibrium advertising level is below
the collusive advertising level. Hence, collusion would not lead to a "Code of Con-
duct" that determines a maximum advertising level.
In order to analyze a two-sided market with both externalities, we build a model
where platforms are symmetrically located on a Salop circle. They simultaneously
decide how much time they o®er to advertisers on their channels. The consumers
are uniformly distributed on the circle, dislike advertisements, and have to choose
2Campell (1999)
3exactly one platform. Advertisers want to advertise their products. Therefore,
they have a certain willingness to pay for "viewer-time" units. In our model the
crucial ingredient is that the advertisers' aggregated demand function for viewer-
time units is decreasing. We show that one can derive such a property from two
kinds of microfoundations. One way is to assume that advertisers have a convex
cost function for producing the advertised good. A second way is to assume word-
of-mouth advertising.3
In this paper we show that advertising can either have the property of a strate-
gic substitute or of a strategic complement. This is in contrast to the existing
literature like Anderson and Coate (2005). By using linear demand functions, we
are able to solve the model analytically. We show that advertising exhibits the
property of a strategic complement (substitute) in the market equilibrium if the
di®erentiation between the platforms is low (high). In addition, we show that
market entry can lead to more or less advertising on each channel. This is also
in contrast to the existing literature. For example Choi (2003) shows that mar-
ket entry unambiguously decreases the advertising level. Furthermore, we get the
surprising result that market entry can increase the incumbents' pro¯ts. This is
the case if the equilibrium advertising level is above the per viewer revenue max-
imizing advertising level. Due to the pecuniary externalities, market entry can
shift the equilibrium advertising level in the direction of the per viewer revenue
maximizing advertising level. This increases the pro¯ts per viewer. If this in-
crease of the pro¯t is higher than the decrease of the pro¯t through the loss of
viewers, then the incumbents are better o®. Moreover, we show that entry has
ambiguous e®ects from a welfare point of view. A social planer has to consider the
following trade-o®. On the one hand, more advertising increases the surplus of the
advertisers. On the other hand, more advertising decreases viewers' utility. We
show that perfect competition can drive the equilibrium advertising level below the
socially optimal advertising level. Therefore, perfect competition may not be de-
sirable even if the sum of viewers' transportation costs decrease with market entry.
This paper is related to the literature on two-sided markets. The basic litera-
ture describes the interaction between two groups that are mediated by a platform
3In the Appendix we consider a third microfoundation, namely switching viewers.
4(see e.g. Armstrong (2005), Cauillad and Jullien (2003), Nocke et.al. (2004),
Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004)). The media market, and particularly the broad-
casting market, is a subclass of such a two-sided market because it has a special
feature. One side, namely advertisers, likes the interaction with the second side,
namely viewers. At the same time viewers dislike the interaction with advertisers.4
Several papers have addressed this peculiarity of the broadcasting market.
Usually the advertising market is modelled in such a way that advertisers have no
bargaining power and take the decisions (advertising prices or quantities) of the
channels as given5 and viewers dislike advertising.6 Papers that consider price
competition are Reisinger (2004), Nilssen and Sorgard (2001) and Kind et.al.
(2005). Given the structure of the US TV advertising market, we argue that
the assumption of quantity competition seems to better ¯t reality. Papers that
consider quantity competition are e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005), Anderson
(2005), Gabszewicz et.al. (2004), Crampes et.al. (2004), Choi (2003), Peitz and
Valetti (2004), and Kohlschein (2004). All papers that consider quantity compe-
tition have a similar microfoundation of advertising, which we describe in Section
3.3. Hereafter, we refer to these papers as the existing literature. Anderson and
Coate (2005) prove that there could be too much or too little advertising com-
pared to the social optimum. Anderson (2005) considers how advertising ceilings
in°uence the quality decisions of the broadcasting channels. Choi (2003) looks
at the endogenous number of broadcasting channels. Kohlschein (2004) considers
competition between public and private channels. Gabszewicz et.al. (2004), like
Peitz and Valetti (2004), consider the location decision of the channels. Crampes
et.al. (2004) allow for (dis)economies of scale of advertising. By including pecu-
niary externalities between the platforms, we extend the framework that is used
in the existing literature.
We will proceed as follows. In the next section we set up the model. In Section
3 we provide di®erent microfoundations for pecuniary externalities. In Section 4
4By contrast, there is often the assumption that viewers like advertising in models concerned with the
press industry (see e.g. HÄ ackner and Nyberg (2000)).
5One exception is the work of Gal-Or and Dukes (2003, 2006) where platforms and advertisers bargain.
6One paper that di®ers is Cunningham and Alexander (2004). They use a completely di®erent mod-
elling approach and incorporate competition in the advertising market, but do not explicitly consider
competition for the viewers.
5we solve the model and derive the symmetric market equilibrium. In Section 5
we determine whether advertising exhibits the property of a strategic substitute
or complement. In Section 6 we consider the e®ects of market entry on platforms'
pro¯ts and on welfare. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
There are three kinds of agents in our model: viewers, broadcasting channels and
advertisers.
Viewers of a broadcasting channel, who are potential consumers of the adver-
tisers, can watch one channel at a certain point in time. In the two-sided market
framework this means that they singlehome. The viewers are heterogeneous with
respect to their preferences of watching a certain channel. Hence, we assume that
they are uniformly distributed on a Salop circle. We denote by x the location of a
viewer on this circle. The mass of consumers is normalized to 1. This leads to the
following utility of a viewer that watches channel i and is located at 0:
U(x) = B ¡ wi ¡ tx: (1)
We denote by wi the advertising level of channel i. Due to the fact that adver-
tising is annoying, wi enters the utility function with a negative sign. Furthermore,
we denote by tx the viewer's disutility from not watching exactly his preferred
programm. B is a constant which ensures that the utility is always positive. We
normalize the outside option to U = 0 and hence the market is always covered.
Furthermore, we assume that the N broadcasting channels are located equidis-
tantly on the Salop circle. Therefore, the marginal consumer between channel i
and j for wj ¡ t
N · wi · wj + t
N is
B ¡ wi ¡ tx = B ¡ wj ¡ t(
1
N
¡ x): (2)
The marginal consumer between channel i and l for wl ¡ t
N · wi · wl + t
N is
B ¡ wi ¡ tx = B ¡ wl ¡ t(
1
N
¡ x): (3)
6Hence, channel i faces the following demand function
Di(wi;wj;wl) = 2x =
1
N
+
wj ¡ wi
2t
+
wl ¡ wi
2t
(4)
for wl ¡ t
N · wi · wl + t
N and wj ¡ t
N · wi · wj + t
N.
Using symmetry between channels j and l yields
Di =
1
N
+
wl ¡ wi
t
for wl ¡
t
N
· wi · wl +
t
N
: (5)
Broadcasting channels try to attract viewers in order to sell time of these
viewers to the advertisers. Therefore, the pro¯t function of a channel i is
¼i = Diwip . (6)
By p we denote the "viewer-time" unit price. If one multiplies the number of
viewers of a channel (= Di) by the advertising time (= wi), then this yields the
channel i's supply of viewer-time units. This supply multiplied by the price per
viewer-time unit yields the channel i's pro¯t. We assume zero marginal costs for
serving a viewer. This is due to the public good nature of broadcasting. Further-
more, we abstract from ¯xed costs. The channels choose wi in order to maximize
their pro¯ts, taking as given the other channels advertising levels.
The advertisers advertise in order to inform viewers about their products.
Therefore, they have a willingness to pay for viewer-time units in order to reach
consumers. We assume that viewer-time units are a homogenous good, which we
justify with our microfoundation. Furthermore, we assume that the advertisers'
inverse demand function for viewer-time units is decreasing in the total supply of
viewer-time units
p = p(w1D1;w2D2;:::;wNDN); (7)
@p
@wiDi
< 0 ;8i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng: (8)
7We are able to solve the model analytically with the following linear demand
function, which we will use throughout the paper.
p = A ¡
N X
k=1
wkDk: (9)
To model the television market, we choose the following time structure. Firstly,
the channels choose simultaneously their advertising levels wi.7 Secondly, the view-
ers decide which channel to watch. Thirdly, a price p, which is determined by a
walrasian auctioneer, clears the market in such a way that the supply of viewer-
time units is equal to the advertisers' demand for viewer-time units.
We think that this is the appropriate time structure to model the television
market. Goettler (1998) describes how the television advertising market works
in the US. The broadcasting channels present their programm schedule in the so
called "Upfront Market", which is in May for the upcoming season in September.
70% to 80% of the advertising time is sold during this upfront market at a market
clearing price.8 The rest is sold in the "scatter market" some weeks before the
advertising slot is aired or is used to promote the channel's own movies and shows.
3 Microfoundation of the Advertisers' Demand
Function
The main di®erence to the existing literature is our inverse demand function of
the advertisers. In the existing literature it is assumed that the price of a viewer-
time unit on channel i is only decreasing in wi, but independent of Di, wj and
Dj; 8j 2 f1;2;:::;Ng=i
pi = pi(wi); (10)
7Consider e.g. that a channel decides to produce, or to buy a sitcom, that is 25 minutes long. If the
channel starts this sitcom at 8 pm and starts the next show on the channel at 8.30 pm, then the channel
commits to 5 minutes advertising.
8To quote from one report about the upfront market: "If supply exceeds demand in the network
Upfront, then let the suppliers battle among themselves to the advantage of advertisers." Source: Jack
Myers Report, April 5, 2004 (www.jackmyers.com)
8@pi
@wi
< 0;
@pi
@Di
= 0; (11)
@pi
@Dj
= 0;
@pi
@wj
= 0 8j 2 f1;2;:::;Ng=i: (12)
Hence, no pecuniary externalities appear because a change in wi does not in°u-
ence the price pj on a channel j. In the following we explain the microfoundation
of the existing literature. Afterwards we show how one derives pecuniary external-
ities due to simple modi¯cations of the existing microfoundation.9 Therefore, we
think that having no pecuniary externalities is an artefact of the particular micro-
foundation that is used in the existing literature. Hence, in our opinion pecuniary
externalities should be the expected case.
Following Bagwell (2003), we can distinguish between three views of advertis-
ing: the persuasive view, the informative view, and the complementary view. As
the existing literature, we concentrate on the informative view. In the existing
models an advertiser g produces one product with constant marginal costs. This
product has no substitute. Viewers are unaware of this product and advertising
has the function of informing a viewer about the existence of this product. By
seeing a commercial of an advertiser g, a viewer learns about the existence of this
product. Each viewer has, by assumption, the same valuation vg for one unit of
a product of ¯rm g. A viewer's valuation is zero for all further units of a prod-
uct. This is common knowledge. Obviously, an advertiser asks a price vg for his
product. Hence, a viewer buys only once one unit of a product after seeing the
corresponding commercial. Given this setup, each advertiser wants to reach each
viewer exactly once. Every additional contact is useless because the consumer is
already informed about the product and never buys a second unit of this product.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the consumers' valuation vg is di®erent for each
kind of product (vg 2 [v;v]). This assumption leads to a decreasing aggregated
inverse demand function for advertising on one channel without generating pecu-
niary externalities between the channels. For example, suppose a price of 10 for
one viewer-time unit on a certain channel. Then only the advertisers that have a
9In the following we only consider a microfoundation with a convex cost function or with word-of-
mouth advertising. A third possibility are switching viewers. However, given switching viewers, we are not
able to derive that viewer-time units are a homogenous good. We can only justify pecuniary externalities.
Therefore, we consider the case of switching viewers in the Appendix.
9product vg ¸ 10 advertise on this channel i. If another channel increases his ad-
vertising level, then this does not in°uence the willingness to pay of the advertisers
to advertise on channel i because the revenue from advertising remains constant.
Thus, 10 remains the equilibrium price on channel i and no pecuniary externalities
appear in this existing setup.
In order to derive microfoundations for the pecuniary externalities, we modify
this framework. We assume that all advertisers are homogenous in such a way
that each advertiser has one kind of product for that no substitute exists. Fur-
thermore, a consumer has the valuation v for exactly one unit of each product.
As in the existing literature, the willingness to pay is zero for further units of a
product. Viewers are unaware of the existence of an advertiser's product. Adver-
tising has the function of informing the viewers about its existence. In contrast
to the framework above, we do not assume that a viewer learns for sure that the
product exists after he has seen the product's commercial. In fact, we take into
account that viewers might be inattentive. Therefore, we assume that a viewer
gains knowledge with a certain probability z after seeing an advertisement. This
probability increases in the length of the commercial. Given the assumption of
homogenous advertisers, we can concentrate on one representative advertiser g.
In order to derive the advertiser g's demand function for viewer-time units, we
write down his pro¯t function
¼g = v
N X
k=1
z(wgk)Dk ¡ C(
N X
k=1
z(wgk)Dk) ¡
N X
k=1
pkwgkDk . (13)
By wgi we denote the advertiser g's advertising level on channel i. The ad-
vertising level wgi determines the probability z = z(wgi) with which a consumer
gets aware of the advertiser's product if he watches channel i. If a viewer becomes
aware of the product, we know that his product valuation is v. Obviously, the
optimal price that an advertiser g should ask for his product is v. Hence, the ¯rst
term displays the revenue of selling the advertised good, the second the costs of
producing the advertised good, and the third the costs of advertising.
10Microfoundation 1: Convex Cost Function for Producing the Adver-
tised Good
Suppose that the probability z increases linearly in wgi
z(wgi) =
wgi
A
: (14)
A is a parameter that normalizes the probability z(wgi) 2 [0;1]. Hence, the
advertiser g sells
PN
k=1
wgk
A Dk units at a price of v.
Furthermore, suppose that the advertiser has a strictly convex cost function
for producing the advertised good10
C0(
N X
k=1
wgk
A
Dk) ¸ 0; C00(
N X
k=1
wgk
A
Dk) > 0: (15)
This yields the following pro¯t function
¼g = v
N X
k=1
wgk
A
Dk ¡ C(
N X
k=1
wgk
A
Dk) ¡
N X
k=1
pkwgkDk . (16)
The advertiser maximizes his pro¯t by his choice of wgiDi. Therefore, maximiz-
ing the advertiser g's pro¯t function with respect to wgiDi leads to his willingness
to pay for the last viewer-time unit on channel i11
pi =
v
A
¡ C0 . (17)
We see that viewer-time units are a homogenous good because C0 does not
depend on the particular channel i. Therefore, the prices for viewer-time units
have to be the same on all channels
pi = p 8i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng: (18)
10Armstrong (2004) mentions this idea in the context why the advertisers' payo®s need not to be
constant. Cunningham and Alexander (2004) also use a convex cost funtion in their setup.
11The SOC is globally satis¯ed.
11Furthermore, the inverse demand function p = v
A ¡ C0 is decreasing in wgiDi
@p
@wgiDi
= ¡C00 < 0 ;8i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng . (19)
Summing up, we see that the broadcasting channels have pecuniary exter-
nalities given increasing marginal costs for producing the advertised good. The
intuition for the pecuniary externality is obvious. If an advertiser g increases his
advertising level on a channel, then the advertising ¯rm g sells more products.
Hence, the ¯rm g's willingness to pay for the last viewer-time unit decreases on
all channels because his marginal costs are higher compared to the situation before.
In order to derive the linear demand function
p = A ¡
N X
k=1
wkDk; (20)
suppose that a consumer has the valuation v = A2. Furthermore, we assume
that the cost function for producing the advertised good is
C(
N X
k=1
zg(wgk)Dk) =
A2
2
(
N X
k=1
wgk
A
Dk)2 . (21)
Plugging into the pro¯t function yields
¼g = A2
N X
k=1
wgk
A
Dk ¡
A2
2
(
N X
k=1
wgk
A
Dk)2 ¡
N X
k=1
pwgkDk . (22)
Maximizing with respect to wgiDi and solving for p leads to
p = A ¡
N X
k=1
wgkDk . (23)
12Summing up over all M advertisers yields the aggregated inverse demand func-
tion
p = A ¡
N X
k=1
wkDk . (24)
Microfoundation 2: Word-of-Mouth Advertising
Another way to give a microfoundation is word-of-mouth advertising. In the
following we assume that the marginal costs for producing the advertised good are
constant. We normalize these costs to zero without loss of generality.
The idea behind the word-of-mouth advertising setup is that a viewer can learn
about the existence of a certain product in two di®erent ways. On the one hand, he
can become aware of the product through advertising. On the other hand, he can
become aware of it by recognizing that another person has bought this product.
In order to capture this idea, we extend the model by introducing two periods. In
the ¯rst period the viewers are exposed to the advertising spots of the di®erent
¯rms. Depending on the length of advertisement wgi, they buy the product of
advertiser g with probability z(wgi) =
wgi
A . In the second period we assume that
always pairs of viewers meet each other. In particular each viewer meets one other
viewer. A viewer sees whether the other viewer has bought a product of ¯rm g
or not. Suppose that a viewer has not become aware of the product in the ¯rst
period and meets a viewer in the second period who has bought the product in
the ¯rst period. Given this, the non-buyer of the ¯rst period becomes aware of the
product and also buys it. Such a constellation, where a non-buyer meets a buyer,
is the only possibility how sales occur in the second period. Formalizing this idea
leads to the following pro¯t function of an advertiser g
¼g = v[
N X
k=1
Dk
wgi
A
+
N X
k=1
Dk(1 ¡
wgk
A
)
N X
j=i
Dj
wgj
A
] ¡
N X
k=1
pkwgkDk . (25)
Maximizing with respect to wgkDk leads to
13pk = v(
E®ect 1 z}|{
1
A
+
E®ect 2 z }| {
(¡
1
A
N X
k=1
Dk
wgk
A
) +
E®ect 3 z }| {
1
A
N X
k=1
Dk(1 ¡
wgk
A
)) . (26)
We see that if channel k increases his supply of viewer-time units, then three
e®ects appear:
E®ect 1: The probability increases that a viewer of this channel buys the prod-
uct in the ¯rst period.
E®ect 2: The probability decreases that a viewer of this channel buys the prod-
uct in the second period 2. This is due to the fact that it is less likely that a viewer
of channel k does not buy in the ¯rst period.
E®ect 3: The probability increases that a non-buyer meets a buyer in the sec-
ond period.
The sum of the three e®ects multiplied by the price v yields the marginal
revenue of advertising on channel k. This is the advertiser's willingness to pay
for the last viewer-time unit on channel k. We see that viewer-time units are a
homogenous good because the willingness to pay for the last viewer-time unit is
the same on all channels
p = pi 8i 2 f1;:::;Ng: (27)
Furthermore, simplifying Equation 26 yields
p = 2
v
A
(1 ¡
N X
i=1
Di
wgi
A
) . (28)
We see that the inverse demand function is decreasing in wgiDi
@p
@wgiDi
= ¡2
v
A2 < 0 8i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng . (29)
14In particular there are two reasons why the willingness to pay decreases if the
supply increases:
Reason 1: It is less attractive to increase the probability that a viewer buys in
the ¯rst period because the probability that he meets a buyer in the second period
increases (= ¡ 1
A2).
Reason 2: It is less attractive to increase the probability that a viewer buys
the product in the ¯rst period because the probability that this buyer meets a
non-buyer in the second period decreases (= ¡ 1
A2).
As the microfoundation with a convex cost function, this mircrofoundation
yields the linear demand function with which we work later on. Suppose that the
consumers' valuation is
v =
A2
2
. (30)
This yields the following pro¯t of advertiser g
¼g =
A2
2
[
N X
k=1
Dk
wgk
A
+
N X
k=1
Dk(1 ¡
wgk
A
)
N X
j=1
Dj
wgj
A
] ¡
N X
k=1
pwgkDk . (31)
Maximizing with respect to wgkDk leads to
p = A ¡
N X
k=1
wgkDk . (32)
Summing up over all M advertisers yields the linear inverse demand function
p = A ¡
N X
k=1
wkDk . (33)
154 Competition in Advertising Levels
In this section we look at the pro¯t maximization problem of the channels and we
solve the model for the symmetric market equilibrium. The broadcasting channel
i has the following maximization problem
max
wi
¼i = Diwip; (34)
with
Di =
1
N
+
wj ¡ wi
2t
+
wl ¡ wi
2t
for wj ¡
t
N
· wi · wj +
t
N
(35)
and
p = A ¡
N X
k=1
wkDk: (36)
The ¯rst order condition of channel i can be written as
@¼i
@wi
=
@Di
@wi
pwi + Di
@(pwi)
@wi
= 0 . (37)
Hence, the optimal advertising level solves the trade-o® between losing the
revenue from a viewer and increasing the revenue per viewer.
Another possibility to express the ¯rst order condition of channel i is
@¼i
@wi
=
Scale Up E®ect
z}|{
Dip +
Quantity E®ect
z }| {
@Di
@wi
wip +
Price E®ect z }| {
Diwi
@p
@wi
+ Diwi
@p
@Di
@Di
@wi
+ Diwi(
@p
@Dj
@Dj
@wi
+
@p
@Dl
@Dl
@wi
)= 0: (38)
To understand this FOC, we consider a "One-Sided Market" maximization
problem. Usually the marginal revenue, R = pq, exhibits in a "One-Sided Market",
depending on the kind of strategic variable, a simple trade-o®:
² Suppose that the quantity q is the strategic variable, so R(q) = p(q)q. If a
¯rm increases q, then it sells one more unit (=Scale Up E®ect), but every
unit at a smaller price (=Price E®ect)
16@R
@q
=
Scale Up E®ect
z}|{
p +
Price E®ect z}|{
@p
@q
q : (39)
² Suppose that the price p is the strategic variable, so R(p) = pq(p). If a
¯rm increases p, then it sells all units at a marginal higher price (=Scale Up
E®ect), but only a smaller number of units (=Quantity E®ect)
@R
@p
=
Scale Up E®ect
z}|{
q +
Quantity E®ect
z}|{
@q
@p
p : (40)
In our two-sided-market setup we have the combination of a price and a quan-
tity competition. The advertising level is a kind of price for the viewers. For the
advertisers it is, multiplied by the number of viewers, the supply. This is re°ected
in the ¯rst order condition. There we have, beside the "Scale Up E®ect", the
"Price E®ect" as well as the "Quantity E®ect". For the "Price E®ect" we have to
take into account that if a channel i increases its advertising level, then it directly
increases the supply of viewer-time units (=direct e®ect). But furthermore, it
changes the distribution of the viewers on the channels. This changes the supply
of viewer-time units, which has a further impact on the price (=indirect e®ect).
@p
@wi
=
direct e®ect z}|{
@p
@wi
+
indirect e®ect z }| {
@p
@Di
@Di
@wi
+
@p
@Dj
@Dj
@wi
+
@p
@Dl
@Dl
@wi
(41)
with l and j as the neighbors of i.
In order to derive the symmetric market equilibrium, we look at the corre-
sponding ¯rst order condition
@¼i
@wi
jw¤
1=w¤
2=:::=w¤
N=
1
N
p¤ ¡
1
t
w¤
ip¤ +
1
N
w¤
i
@p¤
@w¤
i
= 0: (42)
17Using the speci¯ed demand functions, we can solve for the symmetric equilib-
rium advertising level w¤
i.
Proposition 1. Assume that the viewers' demand function is (with ¡i as the
symmetric neighbors of i)
Di =
1
N
+
w¡i ¡ wi
t
for w¡i ¡
t
N
· wi · w¡i +
t
N
(43)
and that the advertisers' inverse demand function is
p = A ¡
N X
k=1
Dkwk: (44)
The advertising level
w¤
i =
(Nt + t + N2A) ¡
p
(Nt + t + N2A)2 ¡ 4N3tA
2N2 (45)
is the unique symmetric Nash-Equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
5 Has Advertising the Property of a Strate-
gic Substitute or Complement?
In the existing literature advertising has the property of a strategic complement.
In these setups advertising is a kind of price for the consumers and no pecuniary
externality appears. Hence, as in price competition, each channel decreases his
advertising level if another channel decreases his advertising level. In the following
we show that it is not obvious that advertising has the property of a strategic
complement given pecuniary and participation externalities.
For simplicity we consider a duopoly (N = 2). We denote the two channels
by fi;¡ig. Whether we have strategic substitutes or complements depends on the
sign of
@2¼i
@wi@w¡i
=
@p
@w¡i
@(Diwi)
@wi
+
@Di
@w¡i
@(pwi)
@wi
+ wi[
@2Di
@wi@w¡i
p + Di
@2p
@w¡i@wi
] Q 0:
(46)
We see that channel ¡i in°uences the price function p and the demand function
Di. This has four consequences:
18² it changes the price p (=
@p
@w¡i)
² it changes the number of viewers of channel i (= @Di
@w¡i)
² it changes the impact of ¯rm i on the price p (=
@2p
@wi@w¡i)
² it changes the impact of ¯rm i on the number of viewers Di (= @2Di
@wi@w¡i)
The change in the price p in°uences the incentive to change the quantity of
viewer-time units (
@(Diwi)
@wi ). If the price decreases, then it gets less desirable to
have more viewer-time units. The change in the number of viewers Di changes
the incentive to change the revenue per viewer
@(pwi)
@wi . Given more viewers, it gets
more preferable to have a high revenue per viewer. Furthermore, the changes of
the impact of the advertising level on the audience size and on the price have an
additional e®ect on the incentives to change the advertising level. The number
of viewers that one loses with a higher advertising level changes. Moreover, the
impact of an increase in the advertising level on the price changes.
With our speci¯ed viewers' demand function, we have that @Di
@w¡i = 1
t given
w¡i ¡ t
2 · wi · w¡i + t
2 and @2Di
@wi@w¡i = 0 because
Di =
8
> <
> :
1 if wi < w¡i ¡
w¡i
t
1
2 +
w¡i¡wi
t if w¡i ¡ t
2 · wi · w¡i + t
2
0 if w¡i + t
2 < wi
. (47)
Furthermore, given the speci¯ed advertisers' demand function p = A¡
PN
k=1 Dkwk,
the cross derivative is
@2p
@wi@w¡i = ¡2
t for w¡i¡ t
2 · wi · w¡i+ t
2. We cannot make
any statement about the sign of
@p
@wi and
@p
@w¡i without knowing the actual values
of wi and w¡i because
@p
@wi
=
8
> > > <
> > > :
¡1 if wi < w¡i ¡ t
2
¡Di + wi
t ¡
w¡i
t · 0 if w¡i ¡ t
2 · wi · w¡i + t
4
¡Di + wi
t ¡
w¡i
t > 0 if w¡i + 1
4t < wi · w¡i + t
2
0 if w¡i + t
2 < wi
. (48)
19Hence, it is possible that the price per viewer-time unit increases if a chan-
nel extends his advertising level. To illustrate this point, suppose two channels.
Assume that channel 1 has a higher advertising level than channel 2 in such a
way that channel 1 has only "one" remaining viewer. If channel 1 increases his
advertising level even further, then this last viewer switches to channel 2. Thus,
the higher advertising level of channel 1 decreases the aggregated supply of viewer-
time units and increases the market price p.
Let us now determine the reaction function of channel i: w¤
i = w¤
i(w¡i). In
order to do this, we have to distinguish between three cases:
Case 1: w¡i > wH
¡i = A
2 + t
2
Suppose that w¡i > A
2 + t
2. We can calculate that wi = A
2 maximizes channel
i's revenue per viewer. Furthermore, we have that
Di(wi =
A
2
;w¡i ¸ wH
¡i) = 1 .
Hence, wi = A
2 has to be channel i's best response. If channel i chooses wi = A
2 ,
then he all viewers watch his program and he has the highest possible revenue per
viewer.
Case 2: wH
¡i ¸ w¡i ¸ wC
¡i = 7
4t + 1
2A ¡ 1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
In this second case w¡i is not high enough to allow channel i to choose wi = A
2
and still to have Di = 1. Given this w¡i, the pro¯t of channel i decreases in wi
( @¼i
@wi < 0). A higher advertising level leads to a lower number of viewers and the
change in the revenue per viewer cannot make up for this loss. Hence, reducing
the advertising level increases the pro¯t as long as Di < 1. Therefore, we derive a
corner solution w¤
i(w¡i) = w¡i ¡ t
2 where Di = 1.
Case 3: w¡i < wC
¡i = 7
4t + 1
2A ¡ 1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
In Case 3 we have an interior solution. The reaction function can be calculated
and is
20wCase3
i = (1 +
1
48
t2 +
5
24
w¡it ¡
1
6
At +
1
16
w2
¡i)[
3
64
tw2
¡i ¡
1
16
w¡iAt ¡
1
64
w3
¡i +
1
576
[1440t4w¡iA + 1296Atw4
¡i ¡ 432A2t2w2
¡i + 2376w3
¡it2A
¡5760w¡it3A2 + 7632t3Aw2
¡i ¡ 3540t3w3
¡i ¡ 3t6 ¡ 90t5w¡i ¡ 927t4w2
¡i ¡ 576t4A2 ¡
2052t2w4
¡i ¡ 1296w5
¡it + 1536A3t3 + 72t5A]
1
2]
1
3 +
1
4
t +
3
4
w¡i
We summarize these ¯ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In a duopoly with
Di =
8
> <
> :
1 if wi < w¡i + t
2
1
2 +
w¡i¡wi
t if w¡i ¡ t
2 · wi · w¡i + t
2
0 if w¡i + t
2 < wi
(49)
and
p = A ¡ Diwi ¡ D¡iw¡i; (50)
the best response function w¤
i(w¡i) of platform i is
w¤
i =
8
> <
> :
A
2 if wH
¡i = A
2 + t
2 < w¡i
w¡i ¡ t
2 if wC
¡i · w¡i · wH
¡i
wCase3
i :=interior solution if w¡i < wC
¡i = 7
4 + A
2 ¡ 1
4
p
25t2 + 4At + 4A2
.(51)
Proof. See Appendix.
In the ¯rst case it is obvious that advertising is neither a strategic substitute
nor a strategic complement. In the second case we have, due to the corner solu-
tion, a perfect strategic complement. Whether advertising exhibits the property
of a strategic complement or substitute in the case of an interior solution depends
on the actual values of wi and w¡i. We have plotted two numerical examples to
illustrate this (see Figure 1).
Given a high di®erentiation parameter (t = 200), we see that advertising can
be either a strategic substitute or complement. In the corresponding equilibrium,
21Figure 1: Strategic Substitute or Complement
w¤
i = 50, it is a strategic substitute. In contrast, advertising exhibits the property
of a strategic complement given a low di®erentiation (t = 10). However, we are
able to derive analytical results whether advertising has the property of a strategic
substitute or complement in a symmetric market equilibrium.
Proposition 3. In the symmetric Nash-Equilibrium of a duopoly advertising has
the property of a
² strategic substitute if di®erentiation between platforms is relatively high
(t > 4
7(2
p
2 ¡ 1)A)
² strategic complement if the di®erentiation between platforms is relatively low
(t < 4
7(2
p
2 ¡ 1)A)
Proof. See Appendix.
22If one considers the advertising market, then one expects that advertising has
the property of a strategic substitute because channels compete in quantities. In
contrast, if one considers the viewer market, then one expects the property of a
strategic complement because advertising is a kind of price for the viewers. The
intuition of the proposition is the following. Due to the fact that we consider a
symmetric situation, no e®ects that result from asymmetric advertising levels ap-
pear. Furthermore, suppose that the di®erentiation is high. In this case a change
in the advertising level has no big impact on the viewer side and the e®ects of
the advertising market dominate. Advertising has on the advertising market the
property of a strategic substitute. Therefore, we have exactly this property if the
di®erentiation is high. If the di®erentiation is low, then the opposite is true.
6 Market Entry
In this section we consider market entry. Given the introduction of Digital Televi-
sion, broadcasting frequencies are no longer a scare resource. Governments use this
to award additional licenses. This yields tougher competition between the broad-
casting channels. Choi (2003) shows, by using the Anderson and Coate (2005)
framework, that market entry leads to a lower advertising level and that it de-
creases the pro¯ts of the channels. In the following we show that this does not
have to be true if we take into account pecuniary and participation externalities.
In order to do this, we start by looking at the role of the di®erentiation param-
eter t and the demand parameter A. If the di®erentiation parameter t increases,
then the viewers' demand function gets less elastic. Furthermore, in the symmetric
market equilibrium, the size of the price change
@p
@wi is independent of t and always
¡Di = ¡ 1
N. Hence, an increase in t leads to a higher equilibrium advertising level
due to the less elastic demand function.
Additionally, if the parameter A increases, then the equilibrium advertising
level rises because the advertisers' willingness to pay increases. This has two ef-
fects. On the one hand, it is more attractive to increase the advertising level
because the revenue per advertising unit (= Dip) increases. On the other hand, it
23is less attractive to increase the advertising level because the revenue per viewer
increases (= wip) and more advertising leads to a smaller audience size. Therefore,
the two e®ects work in the opposite direction. One can summarize both e®ects
in the term p
@(Diwi)
@wi . In a symmetric equilibrium we have
dp
dwi < 0. Therefore,
it has to be that p
@(Diwi)
@wi > 0 in order to ful¯ll the ¯rst order condition. If the
price p increases, then the value of
@(Diwi)
@wi has to decrease in order to satisfy the
¯rst order condition. We see that the second derivative is negative (
@2(Diwi)
@w2
i
< 0).
Therefore, due to the higher price p, the revenue per viewer has to decrease, which
the channels achieve by a higher advertising level.
We summarize these ¯ndings in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If the di®erentiation between the ¯rms increases, then the equilibrium
advertising level increases
@w¤
i
@t
> 0:
If the advertisers' demand function shifts out, then the equilibrium advertising level
increases
@w¤
i
@A
> 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
In the following we use Lemma 1 to show that market entry can either lead to
a higher level of advertising or a lower level of advertising.
Proposition 4.
Market entry yields
² a higher level of advertising (
@w¤
i
@N > 0) if the di®erentiation between the
channels is relatively high (t > 2N2A
2+N );
² a lower level of advertising (
@w¤
i
@N < 0) if the di®erentiation between the chan-
nels is relatively low (t < 2N2A
2+N ).
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand the intuition behind this Proposition 4, let us consider the ¯rst
order condition. In a symmetric equilibrium we have
24@¼i
@wi
jw¤
1=:::=w¤
N= ¡
1
t
pw¤
i +
1
N
@(w¤
ip)
@wi
= 0: (52)
Using the implicit function theorem yields
dw¤(N)
dN
= ¡
¡ 1
N2
@(w¤
i p)
@wi + 1
N
@
@(pw¤
i )
@wi
@N
[SOC]
: (53)
Therefore, we see that
dw¤(N)
dN > 0 if
¡
1
N2
@(w¤
ip)
@wi
+
1
N
@
@(pw¤
i )
@wi
@N
> 0: (54)
The crucial point is the change of the marginal revenue per viewer multiplied
by the number of viewers (D¤
i
@(w¤
i p)
@wi ). If this term increases, then ¯rms increase
their advertising levels. Otherwise, they decrease their advertising levels. Note
that only the mentioned term is relevant because market entry does not a®ect the
negative e®ect of increasing advertising, namely losing viewers
@(
@Di
@wi
w¤
i p)
@N = 0.
After market entry each channel has a lower number of viewers in the equilib-
rium. This has two e®ects on the incentives to o®er advertising. We can distinguish
between them by taking the derivative of D¤
i
@(w¤
i p)
@wi with respect to N.
On the one hand, an increase in the advertising level, which yields a higher
revenue per viewer, has a smaller positive e®ect on the pro¯t because it works on
a smaller number of viewers. This is re°ected in the term
@D¤
i
@N
@(w¤
ip)
@wi
= ¡
1
N2
@(w¤
ip)
@wi
< 0 (55)
and gives an incentive to decrease the advertising level.
25On the other hand, the smaller audience size decreases the impact of channel
i on the price because a change in the advertising level leads to smaller change in
the total supply of viewer-time units. This is re°ected in the term
D¤
i
@(
@(w¤
i p)
@wi )
@N
=
1
N
w¤
i
1
N2 > 0 (56)
and gives an incentive to increase the advertising level.
Therefore, we see that a smaller audience size has two counteracting e®ects.
The total e®ect depends on the size of the di®erent e®ects. The dimension of the
¯rst e®ect decreases in the advertising level,12 and the dimension of the second
e®ect increases in the advertising level.13 Hence, if the advertising level w¤
i is rel-
atively high, then the total e®ect is positive and market entry leads to an even
higher advertising level. We have already seen that a higher t leads to a higher
w¤
i (see Lemma 1). Therefore, if the di®erentiation is relatively high, then the
equilibrium value of the advertising level is above the threshold value. Hence, the
advertising level increases if market entry occurs. One may wonder why t has to
be higher if A increases (tcrit = 2N2A
2+N ) because w¤
i increases if A increases. But
a higher A has two e®ects. A higher A leads to a higher w¤
i but it increases the
equilibrium value of p¤, which puts more weight on the ¯rst e®ect (see Equation
55).
To summarize, we see that the e®ect of market entry on the advertising level
is ambiguous. Given a high level of di®erentiation, the advertising level increases,
and given a low level of di®erentiation, it decreases.
In a next step we consider how market entry a®ects the pro¯ts of the broad-
casting channels. There exists an advertising level b w = A
2 that maximizes the
revenue per viewer
@[(A ¡ wi)wi]
@wi
= A ¡ 2wi = 0; (57)
12 dp
dwijw¤
1=:::=w¤
N = ¡ 1
N;
@(
@p
@wi w
¤
i +p(w
¤
i ))
@wi =
@(¡ 1
N w
¤
i +(A¡w
¤
i ))
@wi < 0
13 @(¡ 1
N w
¤
i +p)
@N = 1
N2w¤
i ;
@( 1
N2 w
¤
i )
@wi > 0
26b wi =
1
2
A: (58)
If the broadcasting channels colluded, then they would choose this advertising
level. In the following we have to distinguish between four situations.
Situation 1. b wi < w¤
i and
@w¤
i
@N > 0 ! @¼
@N < 0
In this situation the equilibrium advertising level is higher than the advertis-
ing level that maximizes the pro¯ts per viewer. Furthermore, the di®erentiation
parameter t is above the threshold level t > 2N2A
2+N . Hence, market entry increases
the equilibrium advertising (see Proposition 4). It is obvious that the pro¯ts of
the channels decrease. Firstly, given market entry, a channel has less viewers in
equilibrium because 1
N decreases in N. Secondly, the equilibrium advertising level
increases, which yields a smaller revenue per viewer.
Situation 2. b wi > w¤
i and
@w¤
i
@N < 0 ! @¼
@N < 0
In this second situation the equilibrium advertising level is lower than the
advertising level that maximizes the revenue per viewer. Furthermore, the dif-
ferentiation parameter t is smaller than the threshold level. Hence, given market
entry, the equilibrium advertising decreases. Therefore, it is obvious that the pro¯t
of an incumbent decrease with market entry.
Situation 3. b wi < w¤
i and
@w¤
i
@N < 0 ! @¼
@N Q 0
In this third situation the equilibrium advertising level is higher than the level
that maximizes the revenue per viewer. Furthermore, given market entry, the
equilibrium level of advertising decreases. Hence, the revenue per viewer increases,
which has a positive e®ect on the pro¯t of an incumbent. At the same time the
incumbent loses viewers, which has a negative impact on the pro¯t. To summarize,
there are two counteracting e®ects on an incumbent's pro¯t. Whether the pro¯t
decreases or increases depends on the size of the di®erent e®ects.
¼i = (A ¡ w¤
i)w¤
i
1
N
(59)
27@¼i
@N
= ¡
1
N2(A ¡ w¤
i)w¤
i +
1
N
@w¤
i
@N
(A ¡ 2w¤
i) Q 0 with b wi < w¤
i and
@w¤
i
@N
< 0(60)
Let us illustrate this case with a numerical example. We assume that A = 10
and t = 300. The ¯rst derivative of a channel's pro¯t function with respect to
N is zero at the values N1 ¼ 25:597 and N2 ¼ 40:838. Therefore, we have two
extrema. Checking the second order condition yields
@2¼i
@N2 = 0:002224 > 0 with N1 = 25:597;
@2¼i
@N2 = ¡0:0010858 < 0 with N2 = 40:838:
Hence, the pro¯t of a channel is increasing in N for N 2]N1;N2[. Figure 2
shows a channel's advertising level and a channel's pro¯t for the numerical exam-
ple. We see that the pro¯t starts to decrease in N, then it increases in N, and if
N > 41, then it decreases again.
Situation 4. b wi > w¤
i and
@w¤
i
@N > 0
Theoretically, this situation may be possible. It could be that the equilibrium
advertising level is too low and that market entry leads to a higher equilibrium
advertising level. Nevertheless, we can exclude this case with our chosen functions.
Given that the di®erentiation parameter t is above the threshold level, the adver-
tising level is always higher than b wi with N > 2.
To show this we calculate the smallest possible w¤
i given t ¸ 2N2A
2+N and compare
it to ^ w
w¤
i(t =
2N2A
2 + N
) =
NA
2 + N
>
A
2
8N > 2: (61)
We summarize our ¯ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Market entry decreases the pro¯ts of the incumbents
² if the di®erentiation is relatively high(t > 2N2A
2+N ). The equilibrium advertis-
ing level is above the revenue maximizing advertising level and market entry
increases the equilibrium advertising level.
28Figure 2: Advertising level and pro¯t
² if the di®erentiation is relatively low (t < N2A
2N¡2). The equilibrium advertising
level is below the revenue maximizing advertising level and market entry
decreases the equilibrium advertising level.
If the di®erentiation parameter has a medium value (2N2A
2+N > t > N2A
2N¡2), then
the equilibrium advertising level is above the revenue maximizing advertising level.
Furthermore, market entry leads to a lower equilibrium advertising level. In this
case it might occur that the incumbents' pro¯ts increase with market entry.
Proof. We know that b wi = A
2 . Looking for t s.t. w¤
i = A
2 yields
t =
N2A
2N ¡ 2
(62)
For the rest see above.
29The surprising ¯nding that market entry can lead to higher pro¯ts comes from
the two externalities that are incorporated in our model. Given the pecuniary
externality, a platform does not internalize that it decreases the other platforms'
pro¯ts if he increases the supply of viewer-time units. This goes in the direction of
a too high advertising level compared to the collusive advertising level. Hence, the
platforms would like to commit to a lower advertising level. Therefore, individu-
ally rational behavior leads to a too high advertising level compared to collectively
rational behavior.
On the other hand, we have the participation externality. Given this external-
ity, a platform does not internalize that it increases the pro¯ts of the competing
platforms if he chooses a higher advertising level. This goes in the direction of a
too low advertising level. Hence, the platforms would like to commit to a higher
advertising level. Therefore, individually rational behavior leads to a too low ad-
vertising level compared to collectively rational behavior.
To illustrate this point, consider the example of two channels and the param-
eter values A = 100 and t = 200. Although we have competition, the equilibrium
advertising level w¤
i = 50 equals the collusive advertising level ^ wi = 50. We see
that the "suboptimal" behavior of the ¯rms on one side of the market, from a
collusive point of view, corrects the "suboptimal" behavior on the other side of
the market.14
In the following we consider the impact of market entry on social welfare. A
social planer, who wants to determine the optimal advertising level e w, has to solve
the following trade-o®. On the one hand, a higher advertising level increases the
surplus of the advertisers. On the other hand, a higher advertising level decreases
the surplus of the viewers. One can easily determine the optimal advertising level
that solves this trade-o®. The willingness to pay of the advertisers (p) should be
14Reisinger (2004) shows a related e®ect of the interaction between the two markets. In his paper
he considers a situation where two platforms compete in prices and the advertisers total demand is
¯xed. Suppose that the di®erentiation parameter is very high. Hence, viewers never switch between the
platforms. Competition between the channels yields an advertising price of zero. In such a situation
Reisinger (2004) shows that an exogenous decrease of the di®erentiation parameter increases the pro¯ts.
The intuition is that viewers begin to switch. Therefore, the channels have to take care of their advertising
levels. This leads to higher prices for advertising, which yields a higher pro¯t per channel.
30equal to the marginal change in the viewers' utility (= 1).
1 = A ¡ e w (63)
e w = A ¡ 1 (64)
One can compute the necessary relationship between t, A and N such that the
equilibrium advertising level is equal to the social optimal advertising level e wi
e wi =
Nt + t + N2A ¡
p
(Nt + t + N2A)2 ¡ 4N3tA
2N2 = A ¡ 1; (65)
t = N2 A ¡ 1
N + 1 ¡ A
: (66)
Concerning the e®ects of market entry on the social welfare, we have to take
into account the reduction of the consumers' transportation costs. Hence, the
social welfare function is
WF = (A ¡ w)w +
1
2
w2 ¡
t
4N
¡ w: (67)
In order to consider whether market entry leads to a higher or lower welfare,
we have again to distinguish between four situations:
Situation 1: w¤
i > e wi and
@w¤
i
@N < 0 ! @WF
@N > 0
In this ¯rst case the di®erentiation parameter t is between 2N2A
2+N > t >
N2 A¡1
N+1¡A. Hence, the advertising level is too high from a welfare point of view.
Market entry leads to a lower advertising level because the transportation costs
are below the threshold level. In this case market entry unambiguously increases
welfare. The advertising level moves in the right direction and the consumers'
transportation costs decrease. Given that the di®erentiation parameter t can be
in the mentioned area, the parameter A has to be A > 1 + N
2 .15
15 2N
2A
2+N > N2 A¡1
N+1¡A ! A > 1 + N
2
31Situation 2: w¤ < e w and @w¤
@N > 0 ! @WF
@N > 0
As in case 1, in this second case market entry increases the social welfare. If
A > 1 + N
2 then t can be between N2 A¡1
N+1¡A > t > 2N2A
2+N . Hence, the advertising
level is below the social optimal advertising level. Market entry increases the ad-
vertising level. Furthermore, the viewers' transportation costs decrease if market
entry occurs.
Situation 3: w¤ > e w and @w¤
@N > 0 ! @WF
@N Q 0
If t is very high (t > maxfN2 A¡1
N+1¡A; 2N2A
2+N g), then the equilibrium advertising
level is above the social optimal level. Market entry yields two counteracting ef-
fects. On the one hand, the consumers' transportation costs are reduced. On the
other hand, the advertising level moves in the "wrong" direction. Nevertheless,
numerical examples let us expect that the positive e®ect on social welfare always
dominates.
Situation 4: w¤ < e w and @w¤
@N < 0 ! @WF
@N Q 0
If the di®erentiation parameter t is very low (t < minfN2 A¡1
N+1¡A; 2N2A
2+N g),
then the advertising level is above the social optimal level. Market entry decreases
the advertising level even further. Even if the consumers' transportation costs
are reduced, it can happen that the social welfare decreases with market entry.
In particular this is true when N goes to in¯nity and A above the critical value
5
4. Given a high N and further market entry, the decrease of the transportation
costs is negligibly and the negative e®ect of a lower advertising level dominates.
Therefore, we conclude that perfect competition has not to be desirable from a
welfare point of view.
Proposition 6. The equilibrium advertising level can be above or below the social
optimal advertising level. Therefore, market entry has two welfare e®ects. On
the one hand, it changes the equilibrium advertising level. This can increase or
decrease social welfare. On the other hand, it decreases the transportation costs of
the viewers, which unambiguously increases welfare. In particular if A > 5
4, then
perfect competition does not maximize social welfare.
32Proof. See Appendix.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a two-sided market model where broadcasting
channels o®er a costless program to viewers. The channels make pro¯ts by selling
viewer-time units to advertisers. In contrast to the existing literature, we have
combined the "participation externality" (more advertisements on platform i de-
crease its own audience size and increase the other platforms' audience sizes) and
the "pecuniary externality" (more advertisements on platform i changes the ad-
vertisers' willingness to pay on all platforms). We have given two examples: the
"Code of Conduct" of the National Association of Broadcasters in the US and the
discussion about advertising on public broadcasting channels in Germany. Both
examples illustrate the existence of pecuniary externalities. We have provided two
microfoundations for pecuniary externalities, namely a convex cost function and
word-of-mouth advertising. We have shown that advertising can have the property
of a strategic substitute or complement. Furthermore, market entry can increase
or decrease the equilibrium advertising level. Both is in contrast to the existing
literature. Moreover, we have shown that market entry can make incumbents bet-
ter o® and that perfect competition does not have to be desirable from a welfare
point of view.
Given the introduction of Digital Television, our model leads to the policy im-
plication that governments should be careful with additional broadcasting licenses.
In particular they should take into account that the equilibrium advertising level
can move in the wrong direction and that this can decrease welfare. Furthermore,
our model shows that advertising ceilings, which restrict the time that a channel
can o®er to advertisers, can be used as a collusive device between the broadcasting
channels in order to increase the price for advertising. This function of advertising
ceilings does not appear in the existing literature. Therefore, we conclude that
a government should be careful with such advertising ceilings, particularly if the
channels ask for such ceilings in order to protect viewer against "too much" ad-
vertising.
33Natural extensions of this model would be to consider the program quality
choices of the broadcasters and to consider the introduction of subscription fees.
In particular the last point seems quite interesting. The existing literature, like
Peitz and Valetti (2004), only considers subscription fees in the Anderson and
Coate (2005) framework, so without pecuniary externalities. It would be interest-
ing to analyze subscription fees under perfect competition in a model that includes
pecuniary externalities. Without pecuniary externalities, channels set monopoly
advertising levels and compensate the viewers by a corresponding lower subscrip-
tion price. Hence, an ine±ciency arises due to the monopoly advertising level,
which is persistent even under perfect competition. Given pecuniary externali-
ties, perfect competition would drive the advertising level to the social optimal
level. Therefore, with two instruments, advertising prices and subscription prices,
and two externalities, pecuniary and participation externalities, more competition
would always increase social welfare. Hence, perfect competition would be unam-
biguously desirable from a welfare point of view.
348 Appendix
Switching Viewers
We consider "switching viewers" in order to derive pecuniary externalities. As
in Anderson and Coate (2005), we consider two periods (say day 1 and day 2)
where the channels broadcast their programs and viewers watch these programs.
Assume furthermore that the channels have to commit to their advertising levels
for the two periods in advance. Additionally, we make the assumption that the
viewers reallocate after the day 1 on the Salop circle at random. A possible ex-
planation is that the kind of di®erentiation of the channels is di®erent. For an
illustration assume that channel A broadcasts always US movies and channel B
broadcasts always French movies. If a viewer decides to watch the US movie, then
this has not to imply that this viewer always watches this channel. Perhaps he has
chosen the US movie because it was a black and white movie and next time the
French movie is black and white. Or he preferred the US movie because it was a
love story and next time the French channel has the better love story to o®er.
Let us look at a representative advertiser g. If he advertises wgi1 on channel
i in the ¯rst period, then the viewers of this channel buy his product with a
probability of z = z(wgi1). We assume that the probability function z is concave
in the advertising level
z0 > 0;z00 < 0 with z(0) = 0;z(1) = 1 .
This assumption ensures that the second order condition of the advertisers are
globally satis¯ed. We stick to the assumption that each consumer is only interested
in one unit of a certain product. This implies that all viewers who have bought
a product in the ¯rst period will for sure not buy such a product in the second
period. Hence, only a non-buyer of the ¯rst period can get informed about the
product of advertiser g in the second period. In this second period the probability
z depends again on the length of the advertising spot.
This leads to the following expected pro¯t function for advertiser g:
¼g = v[
N X
j=1
Dj1(z(wgj1)+(1¡z(wgj1))
N X
i=1
Di2z(wgi2)]¡
N X
j=1
pj1wgj1Dj1¡
N X
i=1
pi2wgi2Di2 .
35Maximizing with respect to the optimal advertising level on channel k in both
periods leads to
pk1 = v[1 ¡
N X
i=1
Di2z(wgi2)]z0(wgk1)
pk2 = v[1 ¡
N X
j=1
Dj1z(wgj1)]z0(wgk2)
For simplicity let us assume, as Anderson and Coate (2005), that every channel
o®ers the same time for commercials in both periods.16 This implies that given wi,
a channel i has the audience size Di in both periods. In particular the channel k
gets the same per viewer-time unit time price pk in both periods. This price pk is
pk = pk1 = pk2 = v[1 ¡
N X
j=1
Djz(wgj)]z0(wgk):
If another channel l changes its advertising level in such a way that ¯rm g
advertises more on this channel, then it distorts the price pk
@pk
@wgl
= ¡vDlz0(wgl)z0(wgk) < 0 .
Thus, the broadcasting channels have pecuniary externalities. The intuition
for this is straightforward: if an advertiser advertises more on channel l in both
periods, then this leads to a decrease in the e®ectiveness of advertising on channel
k. The reason is simply that the probability to get a non-buyer gets smaller
(through the higher advertising level on channel l) and therefore the net payo®
from advertising decreases.
Proof of Proposition 1
Symmetry and the knowledge Di = 1
N yields:
@¼i
@wi
= ¡
1
t
wi[A ¡ Nwi
1
N
] +
1
N
[A ¡ Nwi
1
N
] ¡
1
N2wi = 0
16Given the assumption, the channels have pecuniary externalities on each other in both periods. If we
allow for di®erent advertising levels in the two periods, then we derive intertemporal externalities in the
sense that the advertising level of channel l in one period in°uences the willingness to pay of the advertiser
in the other period. Such a dynamic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. But we expect that such
a dynamic model yields qualitatively the same results.
36@¼i
@wi
= ¡
1
t
wiA +
1
t
w2
i +
1
N
A ¡
1
N
wi ¡
1
N2wi = 0
@¼A
@wA
= ¡N2wiA + N2w2
i + NtA ¡ Ntwi ¡ twi = 0
@¼A
@wA
= N2w2
i + [¡Nt ¡ t ¡ N2A]wi + NtA = 0
wi1;2 =
(Nt + t + N2A) §
p
(Nt + t + N2A)2 ¡ 4N3tA
2N2
Checking the second-order condition:
@2¼i
@w2
i
=
@2Di
@w2
i
wip + 2
@Di
@wi
p + 2
@Di
@wi
wi
dp
dwi
+ 2D
dp
dwi
+ 2Diwi
d2p
dw2
i
< 0:
Evaluating at a symmetric equilibrium yields:
¡
1
t
p¤ + 2
1
t
w¤
i
1
N
¡
1
N2 < 0
p > 2w¤
i
1
N
¡
t
N2
A ¡ w¤
i > 2w¤
i
1
N
¡
t
N2
wi <
t + AN2
N2 + 2N
Now plugging in
w¤
i =
(Nt + t + N2A) ¡
p
(Nt + t + N2A)2 ¡ 4N3tA
2N2
This gives
(Nt + t + N2A) ¡
p
(Nt + t + N2A)2 ¡ 4N3tA
2N2 <
t + AN2
N2 + 2N
(Nt + t + N2A) ¡
p
(Nt + t + N2A)2 ¡ 4N3tA
2N2 ¡
t + AN2
N2 + 2N
< 0
N2t + Nt + 2t ¡ N3A + 2N2A ¡ (N + 2)
p
(Nt + t + N2A)2 ¡ 4N3tA < 0
Case 1: If N2t + Nt + 2t ¡ N3A + 2N2A · 0, then SOC is ful¯lled.
37Case 2: If N2t + Nt + 2t ¡ N3A + 2N2A > 0, then we have to show that
N2t+Nt+2t¡N3A+2N2A < (N+2)
p
(N2t2 + 2Nt2 ¡ 2N3tA + t2 + 2tN2A + N4A2)
(N2t+Nt+2t¡N3A+2N2A)2 < (N+2)2 ¡
N2t2 + 2Nt2 ¡ 2N3tA + t2 + 2tN2A + N4A2¢
¡8N2t2 ¡ 8Nt2 ¡ 8N5A2 ¡ 4N3t2 + 8N4tA < 0
2Nt2 + 2t2 + 2N4A2 + N2t2 ¡ 2N3tA > 0
We know that the term 2Nt2 + 2t2 + 2N4A2 + N2t2 ¡ 2N3tA is always positive
or negative because the Determinant with respect to t and A is negative. We see
immediately that the term is positive for N = 1 (2t2 + 2t2 + 2A2 + t2 ¡ 2tA =
4t2 + A2 + (A ¡ t)2 > 0). Furthermore, we can show that the term 2Nt2 + 2t2 +
2N4A2 + N2t2 ¡ 2N3tA is increasing in N. Therefore it is positive for all N > 1.
@(2Nt2 + 2t2 + 2N4A2 + N2t2 ¡ 2N3tA)
@N
= 2t2 + 8N3A2 + 2Nt2 ¡ 6tN2A > 0
8N3A2 + 2Nt2 ¡ 6tN2A > 0
4N3A2 + Nt2 ¡ 3tN2A > 0
4N2A2 + t2 ¡ 3tNA > 0
(2NA ¡ t)2 + NAt > 0
Now showing that
w =
(Nt + t + N2A) +
p
(Nt + t + N2A)2 ¡ 4N3tA
2N2
is a minimum.
Plugging into
w¤
i <
t + AN2
N2 + 2N
yields
N2t + Nt + 2t ¡ N3A + 2N2A + (N + 2)
p
(Nt + t + N2A)2 ¡ 4N3tA > 0
Case 1: If N2t + Nt + 2t ¡ N3A + 2N2A > 0, then SOC is not ful¯lled.
38Case 2: If N2t + Nt + 2t ¡ N3A + 2N2A · 0, then we have to show
(N2t + Nt + 2t ¡ N3A + 2N2A)2 < (N + 2)2((Nt + t + N2A)2 ¡ 4N3tA):
We know that this is true. See proof of maximum.
Proof of Proposition 2
For Case 2:
@¼i
dwi
jwi=w¡i¡ t
2=
1
2t
¡
¡7w¡it + 3t2 + 2w2
¡i + 3At ¡ 2Aw¡i
¢
= 0
! w¡i =
7
4
t +
1
2
A §
1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
Hence, if player i plays wi = w¡i¡ t
2, then the FOC has two nulls. We can exclude
the point w¡i = 7
4t + 1
2A + 1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) because
w¡i =
7
4
t +
1
2
A +
1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) > wH
¡i =
A
2
¡
t
2
and therefore it falls in the range of Case 1.
Now we check if wi = 7
4t+ 1
2A¡ 1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)¡ t
2 is indeed a maximum
given w¡i = 7
4t+ 1
2A¡ 1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2). Checking the SOC at the value wi =
7
4t+ 1
2A¡ 1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)¡ t
2 and w¡i = 7
4t+ 1
2A¡ 1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
yields
@2¼i
@w2
i
=
1
4t
³
6A + 23t ¡ 7
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
´
:
To show 1
4t
³
6A + 23t ¡ 7
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
´
< 0: Simplifying yields
¡160A2 + 80At ¡ 696t2 < ¡(
1
2
A)2 + At ¡ t2 = ¡(
1
2
A ¡ t)2 < 0
Now more generally: Given the nulls at w¡i = 7
4t + 1
2A § 1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
for wi = w¡i ¡ t
2 and the fact that the SOC is negative at the point wi = w¡i ¡ t
2
with w¡i = 7
4t + 1
2A ¡ 1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) we have that the FOC is negative
for all wi = w¡i ¡ t
2 with
w¡i 2]
7
4
t +
1
2
A ¡
1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2);
7
4
t +
1
2
A +
1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)[
. Therefore, it would payo® to decrease wi. But we are at a kink of the pro¯t
function. Hence, wi = w¡i ¡ t
2 is indeed a maximum. Further decreasing wi does
39not change the audience size (it is Di = 1), but reduces the revenue per viewer.
Next, we show that
7
4
t +
1
2
A ¡
1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) <
A
2
+
t
2
7
4
t +
A
2
¡
1
4
p
25t2 + 4At + 4A2 ¡ (
A
2
+
t
2
) < 0
5
4
t ¡
1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) < 0
5
4
t <
1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
This is true for all t > 0 and A > 0.
For Case 3:
We have to show that the value wCase3
i is indeed an optimum. Therefore, we
show that for all values of wi s.t. w¡i ¡ t
2 · wi · w¡i + t
2 the second order
condition is ful¯lled given that w¡i < 7
4t + 1
2A ¡ 1
4
p
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2).
@2¼i
@w2
i
= ¡
1
2
4At ¡ 12wit + 24w2
i ¡ 36wiw¡i + 4w¡it + 12w2
¡i + t2
t2
Given wi = wi + x with ¡ t
2 · x · t
2, @2¼i
@w2
i
< 0 if
4At ¡ 8w¡it ¡ 12tx + 12w¡ix + 24x2 + t2 > 0
This term is decreasing in wi due to ¡ t
2 · x · t
2. The term is zero if
wzero
¡i =
4At ¡ 12tx + 24x2 + t2
8t ¡ 12x
Hence, it is su±cient to show that wzero
¡i > wC
¡i
wzero
¡i >
4At ¡ 12t ¤ 0 + 24 ¤ 02 + t2
8t ¡ 12(¡ t
2)
> wC
¡i
2
7
A +
1
14
t >
7
4
t +
1
2
A ¡
p
25t2 + 4At + 4A2
3
14
A +
47
28
t <
p
25t2 + 4At + 4A2
9
196
A2 +
141
196
At+
2209
784
t2 ¡(25t2 +4At+4A2) = ¡
775
196
A2 ¡
643
196
At¡
17391
784
t2 < 0
40Proof of Proposition 3
With wA = wB = wi it follows:
@2¼
@wA@wB
=
A ¡ wi
t
¡
1
4
¡
wi
t
Strategic substitutes:
w¤
i =
3
8
t +
1
2
A ¡
1
8
p
9t2 ¡ 8At + 16A2 i 2 fA;Bg
@2¼
@wA@wB
= ¡1 +
1
4t
p
(9t2 ¡ 8At + 16A2) < 0
1
4t
p
(9t2 ¡ 8At + 16A2) < 1
1
16t2
¡
9t2 ¡ 8At + 16A2¢
< 1
9t2 ¡ 8At + 16A2 < 16t2
¡7t2 ¡ 8At + 16A2 < 0
d(¡7t2 ¡ 8At + 16A2)
dt
= ¡14t ¡ 8A < 0
¡7t2 ¡ 8At + 16A2 = 0
t1 = ¡
4
7
A ¡
8
7
p
2A < 0
t2 = ¡
4
7
A +
8
7
p
2A > 0
Therefore given A, the function is positive for all t 2]t1;t2[. Hence, we have
strategic substitutes if
t > ¡
4
7
A +
8
7
p
2A =
4
7
A(2
p
2 ¡ 1)
Otherwise we have strategic complements.
Proof of Lemma 1
We show
@w¤
i
@t > 0 by using the implicit function theorem.
d
@¼i
@wi
jw¤
1=:::=w¤
N=
@ @¼i
@wi
@t
dt +
@2¼i
@w2
i
dwi = 0
41dw¤
i
dt
= ¡
pw¤
i
@Di
@wi@t
[SOC]
dw¤
i
dt
= ¡
pw¤
i
1
t2
[SOC]
> 0
We show
@w¤
i
@A > 0 by using the implicit function theorem.
d
@¼i
@wi
jw¤
1=:::=w¤
N=
@ @¼i
@wi
@A
d + A
@2¼i
@w2
i
dwi = 0
dw¤
i
dA
= ¡
pw¤
i
@Di
@wi@A
[SOC]
dw¤
i
dA
= ¡
¡1
t
@p
@Aw¤
i + 1
N
@p
@A
[SOC]
dw¤
i
dA
= ¡
@p
@A
@(Diwi)
@wi
[SOC]
> 0
because
@¼i
@wi
jw¤
1=:::=w¤
N=
+ z }| {
p
@(Diwi)
@wi
+
¡ z }| {
@p
@wi
Diwi= 0
Proof of Proposition 4
The ¯rst order condition at a symmetric equilibrium w¤
1 = ::: = w¤
N is
@¼i
@wi
= ¡
1
t
pw¤
i +
1
N
@(w¤
ip)
@wi
= 0
By totally di®erentiating this ¯rst order condition we get
[SOC]dwi + [¡
1
t
@(w¤
ip)
@N
¡
1
N2
@(w¤
ip)
@wi
+
1
N
@
@(pw¤
i )
@wi
@N
]dN = 0
[SOC]dwi + [¡
1
N2
@(w¤
ip)
@wi
+
1
N
@
@(pw¤
i )
@wi
@N
]dN = 0
@w¤
i(N)
@N
= ¡
¡ 1
N2
@(w¤
i p)
@wi + 1
N
@
@(pw¤
i )
@wi
@N
[SOC]
42Therefore,
@w¤
i (N)
@N > 0 if
¡
1
N2
@(w¤
ip)
@wi
+
1
N
@
@(pw¤
i )
@wi
@N
> 0
@
@(pw¤
i )
@wi
@N
>
1
N
@(w¤
ip)
@wi
@(p ¡ 1
Nw¤
i)
@N
>
1
N
(p ¡
1
N
w¤
i)
1
N2w¤
i >
1
N
(p ¡
1
N
w¤
i)
2
N
w¤
i > p
2
N
w¤
i > (A ¡ w¤)
w¤
i >
AN
2 + N
Plugging in w¤
i, one sees that this is the case if t > 2N2A
2+N
Proof of Proposition 6
It remains to show:
lim
N!1
(
@WF
@N
=
@w¤
i
@N
(A ¡ w¤
i ¡ 1) +
t
4N2 · 0)
Using the Implicit Function Theorem we know that
@w¤
i
@N
= ¡
1
N2(N+2
N w¤
i ¡ A)
¡A
t + N+2
Nt w¤
i ¡ 1
N2
This leads to
@WF
@N
= ¡
1
N2(N+2
N w¤
i ¡ A)
¡A
t + N+2
Nt w¤
i ¡ 1
N2
(A ¡ w¤
i ¡ 1) +
t
4N2
lim
N!1
1
N2f
¡(N+2
N w¤
i ¡ A)
¡A
t + N+2
Nt w¤
i ¡ 1
N2
(A ¡ w¤
i ¡ 1) ¡
t
4
g = 0
43due to
lim
N!1
w¤
i =
( t
N + t
N2 + A) ¡
p
(Nt+t+N2A)2¡4N3tA
N2
2
= 0
Now to show that we approach zero from below with A > 5
4
lim
N!1
f
¡(N+2
N w¤
i ¡ A)
¡A
t + N+2
Nt w¤
i ¡ 1
N2
(A ¡ w¤
i ¡ 1) ¡
t
4
g < 0
A
¡A
t
(A ¡ 1) +
t
4
< 0
A >
5
4
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